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• Most low income countries are characterised by a high dependence on exports of a small
number of agricultural or mineral commodities. In the 1980s, the economic and social per-
formance of these countries has been extremely dismal. Declining per capita incomes,
stagnating food production, and an increasing foreign debt burden indicate a failure of
development strategies applied in these countries as well as of foreign aid policies pursued
by donor countries and institutions.
• Low income countries have suffered from a combination of adverse commodity price
movements and an increasing inability to adjust to a changing external environment.
Adjustment has been hampered by conflicting and often misguided policy signals, weak
economic institutions, and a rapid deterioration of public management in general. These
shortcomings were rooted in fundamental social conflicts, in particular the "personal rule"
of parasitic elites or the emergence of a non-productive state class.
• A development strategy for the 1990s has to pave the way towards economic diversifica-
tion and a better integration of domestic markets in low income countries. Such a strategy
requires the discrimination of the commodity producing sector to be abandoned, a return
to macro-economic stability, and institution building. Necessary prerequisites for success
are improved access of low income countries to the markets of industrialised countries and
the necessity to convince the ruling elites to sustain policy reform.
• Industrialised countries have hitherto neglected the political economy of decision-making in
low income countries. Neither stricter conditionality nor more foreign aid or more sophisti-
cated international commodity policies alone will be able to turn the tide. Policy reform has
to be initiated from within low income countries with foreign donors mainly playing a cata-
lytic role. For this reason, foreign aid policies should give priority to a strengthening of politi-
cal bargaining processes within low income countries and to supporting actually implemen-
ted reform programmes.
• Such a foreign aid policy for the 1990s would require new criteria for aid allocation among
countries and new priorities for aid programmes and projects. To remove politico-economic
constraints and institutional weaknesses, foreign aid should focus on the development of
a well-funetioning domestic economic order, human resource development, and financing
of poverty or ecology-related programmes. If some governments of low income countries
are notoriously unwilling to improve fundamental economic conditions donors should not
hesitate to reduce their efforts to the supply of emergency relief.
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ISSN 0455 - 0420I. Introduction
At the end of the 3rd UN Development Decade concerns about economic and
social progress in the Third World have been aggravated. Despite considerable
efforts, standards of living in the poorest segment of the developing world have
on average hardly improved and the scissors between more advanced and low
income countries has widened. This paper provides an analysis of the major
reasons for this unsatisfactory lack of development and suggests avenues towards
expanding development prospects of low income countries in the 1990s and beyond.
Recommendations for more successful development and foreign aid strategies
have to take into account an important structural weakness characterising most low
income economies. They do not only suffer from segmented markets and often se-
verely distorted incentive systems, but also from a high dependence on production
and exports of a very small number of agricultural and mineral commodities. The
Table shows a sample of 30 low and lower middle income countries in which non-oil
commodities account for over 60 per cent of total exports. In many of these
countries exports of no more than 2 or 3 commodities account for about 90 per cent
of trade-related foreign exchange receipts. Balance of payments positions and gov-
ernment revenues of such countries are highly susceptible to changes of individual
commodity prices so that the vagaries of international commodity markets introduce
an element of uncertainty into public development planning and private investment
decision-making. For this reason, the subsequent analysis focusses on the group
of highly commodity export dependent countries (HCED DCs) and highlights their
development potential.
This discussion paper is the result of a brainstorming session with Professor
Hartwig de Haen (Agricultural Economist, University of Gottingen), Professor
Manfred Feldsieper (Specialist in fiscal and financial policies, University of
Cologne), and Drs. Roland Herrmann (Agricultural Economist), Rolf J. Langhammer
(Trade Economist), and Peter Nunnenkamp (Specialist in development aid policies)
from the Kiel Institute, held in Kiel on 12-13 January 1989. Each participant had
prepared background material for the seminar which was used in the preparation of
this paper. Useful comments by my colleague Bernhard Fischer are gratefully ac-
















































































oil seeds (15), cereals (6)
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II. What Went Wrong?
1. Development Trends
The economic performance of HCED DCs has been very poor since the first oil
price shock in 1973. While commodity price bonanzas at least helped overall econ-
omic growth to keep pace with population growth in the 1970s, the decline of com-modity prices after 1980 was accompanied by a stagnation of officially recorded
economic activities and consequently by a drastic decline of per capita income.
Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, hosting the largest number of HCED DCs expe-
rienced a fall of per capita income of annually 2.9 per cent in the 1980s after an
annual increase of 0.5 per cent in 1973-80. As a result, 1987 per capita incomes
amounted to about three quarters of the level achieved by the end of the 1970s.
Per capita food production was at best stabilised at a rather low level. In a large
number of countries it dropped below the level achieved in 1980. A corollary to
these domestic developments was an increasing foreign debt burden in most HCED
DCs [IMF, 1988].
Such an economic performance coupled with political unrest, ecological vul-
nerability and frequent short-term natural catastrophes has caused fatalism and
resignation in low income countries as well as a feeling of helplessness among
donor countries and institutions. However, the economic potential of these coun-
tries is much larger than suggested by official data, and there are signs of an
unabated responsiveness of individuals to economic incentives. Capacity under-
utilisation, capital flight and brain drain as observed in most HCED DCs are clear
indications of the availability of human and financial capital that has not been pro-
ductively employed. In addition, there is evidence that the volume of economic
transactions must be much higher than officially recorded. Rural as well as urban
producers of goods and services have increasingly resorted to subsistence pro-
duction, informal markets and underground activities. Excessive governmental reg-
ulations have provided ample incentives to earn rents from circumventing controls.
Estimates for Ghana, for instance, suggest a rise of parallel market activities from
1 per cent of official GDP in 1976 to 32 per cent six years later [ May, 1985,
p. 9].
In a nutshell, the economic and social situation of low income countries is
definitely critical but not necessarily hopeless if the available development potential
of these countries can be used more efficiently in the future. To achieve this goal
is not simply a question of appropriate national or international commodity policies.
Commodity dependence is rather a structural symptom of low income economies than
the root of backwardness. What is needed is a far more sweeping approach to de-
velopment which seeks to overcome human capital shortages and to build an eco-
nomic and social framework less hostile to individual and societal achievement than
the present one.2. Reasons for the Present Malaise
In the 1980s, HCED DCs have suffered from a combination of adverse external
tendencies and internal bottlenecks. Declining and volatile terms of trade, pro-
tectionist behaviour of developed countries and mounting external debt problems
have been aggravated by an increasing inability of these countries to adjust to a
changing external environment. International commodity initiatives like commodity
agreements, compensatory financing or preferences granted under the Lome Con-
vention have provided trade-tied aid for HCED DCs, but have also tended to
freeze the production and export structure in favour of the supported products.
An opposite bias has emerged from agricultural policies in industrialised countries
as well as macro-economic and agricultural policies implemented in the countries
themselves. They have discriminated against agricultural production and in par-
ticular against commodity exports. In addition to these conflicting policy signals,
adjustment has been hampered by market segmentation, insufficient linkages among
sectors, government market intervention sometimes bordering on state economic
management, high unit cost of labour, inefficient public enterprises, mounting
budget deficits, and a rapid deterioration of public management in general [ World
Bank, 1988a, Chapter I].
These shortcomings are largely the result of fundamentals characterising most
low income countries: high and accelerating population growth rates (often above 3
per cent per annum), political instability sometimes associated with political
violence and border conflicts, segmentation of societies along tribal boundaries,
and most importantly, "personal rule" of parasitic elites [Jackson, Rosberg, 1982;
1984] or the emergence of a non-productive state class living on rents [Elsenhans,
1981]. The overriding responsibility of the latter interest groups for economic de-
cline and social decay has been amply demonstrated in the literature [e.g.,
Sandbrook, 1985; 1986; Wheeler, 1984; World Bank, 1988a, Par. 1.5] and has to be
taken into account when formulating development aid strategies. The neglect of the
political economy governing decision-making processes in low income countries has
time and again dealt severe blows to structural adjustment efforts carried out
under the auspices of IMF and World Bank.
1 According to the World Bank [1984; 1988b, p. 28] the adjustment process to-
wards relative prices reflecting scarcities has been already started with "impres-
sive efforts" but with such "severe constraints" and "uncertain global prospects"
that increased aid and debt relief should be made available by the developed
countries.III. Major Elements of a Development Strategy in the 1990s
1. Basic Principles
A return of HCED DCs to sustained growth can ultimately not be decreed,
ordered and engineered by governments or development plans. Economic develop-
ment rests to a large extent on initiatives of individual economic agents, parti-
cularly on responses of farmers, entrepreneurs and traders to national and inter-
national economic incentives. Government policies and development aid do have to
'play an important, though supportive role only. The stage for recovery has to be
set by domestic policy reform and greater efforts to mobilise domestic resources.
Aid flows of whatever magnitude can neither be a substitute for sound macro-eco-
nomic management and appropriate incentives nor will they be sufficient to finance
the required investment. However, a continued and reliable support by multilateral
and bilateral donors will remain indispensable given the already high debt burden
of these countries and their limited access to private international capital markets.
The subsequent proposals for policy reform are formulated in terms of general
guidelines for the design of country-specific programmes since HCED DCs are a
fairly heterogeneous group of countries. These guidelines rest on two assumptions:
- Assessments of international commodity markets provide strong support for the
hypothesis that innovations promoting commodity-saving techniques and a delink-
ing of commodity consumption from economic growth in industrialised countries
are irreversible, at least in the case of mineral commodities. The prospects for
producers of agricultural commodities appear less gloomy; but they, too, face a
number of external barriers, i.e., declining oil prices improving the competitive-
ness of petro-based substitutes, the vagaries of agricultural protectionism in
developed market economies as well as saturation tendencies and low income elas-
ticities in consumer markets. Short-term windfalls as a result of, for instance,
exchange rate movements or exogenous supply bottlenecks (e.g., coffee) cannot
offset the long-term trend against primary commodity exporters.
- Low income countries are endowed with the critical minimum of individual initiat-
ive and entrepreneurship as borne out by vibrant subsistence and informal sec-
tors. In most instances, however, these activities have remained economically
inefficient because they are concentrated locally, suffer from high transaction
costs or sub-optimal market sizes, and lack access to technology.
For these reasons, the goal of a development strategy for the 1990s is to
pave the way towards economic diversification of production and a better integra-tion of domestic markets. There is scope for a rehabilitation of commodity produc-
tion in some countries and for the exploitation of new commodities in others, which
is urgently needed to generate the investable funds required for an agricultural-
led economic development path according to the comparative advantage of most
HCED DCs. Policy reform along the lines elaborated below will promote investment
in new agricultural and in non-agricultural activities as well as encourage the de-
velopment of both import-substituting and exporting sectors. Diversification will
ultimately improve the capability of these countries to cope with external shocks,
to benefit from high income elasticities of demand in industrialised countries and
NICs [Balassa, 1983; Balassa, McCarthy, 1984; Riedel, 1984; Bhagwati, 1988], and
last but not least, to attract badly needed private foreign investment.
2. The Role of the Commodity Producing Sector
Since prices of food and primary goods tend to decline in real terms over the
long run, it is often argued that investment in the commodity producing sector is
a losing proposition. This view has to be challenged on two grounds. Firstly, com-
modity producers in HCED DCs are heavily discriminated against by export taxa-
tion and general agricultural policies [Kerr, 1985; Schiff, 1988] as well as by in-
ward-looking industrialisation and macro-economic policies [ Oyejide, 1988; Kerr,
1985; Akiyama, 1988]. Policy-induced discrimination has reduced the profitability
of commodity production and exports and led to a loss of shares in export mar-
kets. Secondly, despite a long-run fall in the terms of trade for traditional com-
modity exports, price elasticities of export demand for individual low income coun-
tries will often be infinite or at least substantially higher in absolute terms than
the price elasticity of import demand in world markets [ Koester et al., 1987].
These observations support the conclusion that the commodity sector can earn
additional foreign exchange and even generate surpluses of investable funds pro-
vided disincentives for commodity production and exports are dismantled. In ad-
dition to indirect taxation, particular weight has to be attached to exchange
The World Bank's Project on "The Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing Poli-
cies" provides convincing empirical evidence on this issue for a large sample of
developing countries [see Krueger et al., 1988; Schiff, 1988]. It is shown in
Schiff [ 1988] that the effect of the indirect, economy-wide interventions general-
ly dominates the direct effects. See also World Bank [ 1986 ] for a similar view.rates. For HCED DCs the exchange rate is determined by foreign exchange earn-
ings received for exports of primary commodities, import protection granted to
manufacturing activities and interventions in foreign exchange markets which all
work in favour of an overvaluation of the national currencies. Such an overvalua-
tion is equivalent to a tax on (traditional and non-traditional) exports. Devaluation
in real terms, e.g., by sterilising foreign exchange earnings from commodity ex-
port and by trade liberalisation raises the price of tradables relative to non-trad-
ables and reduces import demand and demand for foreign exchange. Incentives
would increase for agricultural production in general as well as for agricultural
and non-protected manufactured exports and the production of import substitutes
since devaluation of the national currencies lowers the price of labour, land and
capital in international currency, changes the income distribution in favour of
scarce factors of production, and promotes capital formation financed out of in-
creased profits.
If policy reform is instituted the expansion of the commodity sector is expect-
ed to be self-financed and not a target area for development aid. The commodity
producing sector has rather to assume the role of a nucleus for domestically-fi-
nanced diversification of economic activities and integration of markets. The focus
of aid should be on supporting the implementation of policy reform and the stabili-
sation of fragile institutions.
3. Requirements for Diversification \
Empirical evidence of the past three decades has clearly highlighted the im-
portance of a stable macro-economic environment, i. e. stable monetary and fiscal
policies, and the critical role of prices for economic development [World Bank,
1988a, Par. 2.10]. However, adjustment to new\economic parameters takes consi-
derable time in segmented and distorted markets, a^nd progress towards broadening
the structure of production and exports will require more than "getting the prices
right":
- Budgetary discipline and appropriate incentives for diversification will require a
review of virtually all government activities [Leonard, 1987]. Major issues are a
For the utmost importance of exchange rate policies on structural change in gen-
eral and the recovery of the agricultural sector of HCED DCs in particular, see
Hussain, Thirlwall [1984]; Acharya [1978]; Nashashibi [1980]; Bond [1983];
Kincaid [1984]; Gulhati et al. [1986]; Oyejide [1986]; Tshibaka [1986]; Kimaro
[1988]; Chhibber [1988].10
dismantling of excessive encroachment on private activities, privatisation of gov-
ernment activities (including marketing boards), a rationalisation of pay systems
for public servants, a substantial reduction of the size of the civil service
especially at the unskilled level [Lindauer et al., 1988], improvements of the tax
and customs administrations, and a restructuring of government revenues from
indirect (export taxes, duties) to direct and progressive taxation of income or
land.
- Segmented markets and weak intersectoral linkages result from barriers to access
within and among countries. Measures have to be designed or strengthened that
ensure the freedom of establishment, access to jobs both in the private and the
public sector, and greater mobility of factors of production even across borders.
Constraints originating from artificial colonial or tribal boundaries can be over-
come by regional co-operation in such areas as improving physical infrastruc-
ture and rights of access, facilitating information and communication or promoting
joint training and research.
- Uncertainty about or non-existence of property rights severely limit private risk
taking, i.e. capital formation. Efforts towards institution building and the pro-
tection of individual or collective property rights are, therefore, essential for a
positive response to an improved incentive system.
- Diversification will place greater emphasis on human capital and entrepreneur-
ship. Human resource development will, therefore, be a major challenge for the
1990s. Analytical capabilities for private and public decision-making, receptivity
to technology transfer, and workers' motivation and discipline are all in short
supply in low income countries. These bottlenecks require investment in educat-
ion, on-the-job training and research activities.
- Individual welfare of citizens of poor countries will hardly improve substantially
unless population growth can be held at bay. If population growth rates are not
reduced, income per capita could easily stagnate even under most optimistic as-
sumptions concerning supply responses to appropriate relative prices.
In light of the dismal experience with regional integration schemes both in Latin
America and Africa, customs unions and free trade areas do not seem to be feas-
ible. Such attempts mostly ended in stagnation or even failure since particularly
smaller and less developed member countries were anxious that other member
countries could reap benefits from integration "at their cost" [Langhammer,
Spinanger, 1984, Chapter I]. Vested interests in protected economic activities
and an anticipated shortfall of customs revenues not offset by compensation pay-
ments have proven to be arguments strong enough to abandon intra-regional
trade liberalisation.11
4. Bridging the Transition Period
Problems related to the above long-term strategy are manifold. They centre
around short-term costs of policy reform for poor segments of the society and the
willingness or ability of governments to resist pressure groups suffering from a
reduction of their real income and privileges. Even assuming a strong and reform-
minded government the period of transition until production can fully respond to
real depreciation and changing relative prices is expected to be long. In most low
income countries substantial efforts in the production and dissemination of know-
ledge (induced technical progress) will have to go along with the development of
complementarities among sectors (e.g., transport, commerce). Controversies exist
with regard to the time span needed for transition. Estimates differ widely across
countries [Nashashibi, 1980; Bond, 1983; Kincaid, 1984; Kimaro, 1988; Chhibber,
1988] but even limited experience with often half-way aborted experiments suggests
that short-term adjustment problems can only be overcome by a tremendous effort
coupled with substantial external financial and technical assistance.
The problems of surviving the transition period can be translated into a num-
ber of constraints and open questions:
- How can ruling elites be convinced of the necessity of sustaining policy reform
and which political and social institutions are required to enforce reform meas-
ures?
- How can budget deficits be kept at bay? The loss of earnings from import duties
and export taxes is aggravated by increasing expenditures for debt services
following a devaluation. Savings accruing from a dismantling of subsidy payments
and a re-organisation of the public sector may at least initially not be sufficient
to close the gap in the budget. This makes a tax reform all the more urgent,
but external assistance is also being called for.
- Adjustment lags and short-term vagaries of international commodity prices may
cause temporary balance of payments problems which could threaten the con-
tinued inflow of necessary imports. To prevent such bottlenecks, export earn-
ings should be stabilised (possibly with external assistance) and measures have
to be taken to defeat the widespread export pessimism. To this end an assess-
ment of commodity and trade policies in industrialised countries is on the agenda
which discourage the expansion of traditional and non-traditional exports from
HCED and other poor developing countries.12
- Higher agricultural product prices may lead to an increasing gap between food
requirements and purchasing power of the poor. Therefore, food security be-
comes an imperative mandate both for local government and donors.
- Many low income countries are endowed with vast, but particularly vulnerable
natural resources. Efforts must be made by local governments and donors to
establish ecological stability and economic sustainability of these resources. Poor
rural population groups need alternative technologies and sources of energy
which reduce the tendencies of deforestation and horizontal expansion of land
use which are often the only means of securing a minimum level of living for the
poor.
IV. Agenda for External Assistance in the 1990s
1. Lessons from the Past
Declining per capita incomes are a clear indication that project and programme
aid as well as structural adjustment loans have failed to promote a sustained
growth process in low income countries. Some observers, like Lord Bauer, even
consider development aid as one of the roots of deteriorating economic conditions
while the majority of observers maintains that aid has at least prevented poverty
from turning into catastrophe [e.g. Levy, 1988]. Even if the latter were true such
a "success" does not offer any medium-term perspectives for development aid pol-
icies of industrialised countries. The role of aid would be reduced to emergency
relief without any hope for a final solution of the crisis.
The preceding sections have shown, however, that many poor countries pos-
sess the capability to return to higher economic growth and better standards of
living for the population as a whole provided an improved economic policy manage-
ment is implemented on a sustained basis. This precondition is imperative not only
for a more efficient use of local resources but also for the impact on overall de-
velopment that foreign aid can make. All financial flows are at least to some degree
fungible, and wrong economic incentives encourage a misappropriation of aid flows
for military spending, luxury consumption, inefficient prestige projects or even
capital flight as was observed repeatedly in the past.
Frequently aborted IMF and World Bank adjustment programmes have proven
that an appropriate macro and sector policy management cannot be imposed exter-
nally. The strategic policy changes towards encouraging economic diversification13
and market integration have to come from within the countries concerned with ex-
ternal donors mainly playing a _cataly-tic_rple. Except for technical assistance in
policy analysis and policy implementation, there is little industrialised countries
could directly contribute to setting the wheel in motion. Their main task with re-
spect to the long-term success of diversification efforts is to provide an external
economic environment encouraging entrepreneurs and investors in low income coun-
tries to engage in new activities.
2. Improving the External Economic Environment
To provide access to all markets of industrialised countries and to secure an
uninterrupted availability of imports is an essential and indispensable part of sup-
port for low income countries. Investors in these countries should be confronted
with undistorted world market prices, and they must be assured of a continued
open trading environment.
It is widely established that agricultural policies in industrialised countries
have lowered world prices in international agricultural markets and thereby dis-
torted the shadow price of food production in developing countries [Matthews,
1985; Valdes, Zietz, 1980]. An empirical analysis [Tyers, Anderson, 1988, pp. 197
ff. ] shows that policies implemented in the EC-12, the EFTA-5, the US and Japan
depressed world market prices for wheat, coarse grain, rice, meat, dairy prod-
ucts, and sugar by between 3 and 61 per cent in 1980-82. In addition, industri-
alised countries have contributed significantly to the instability of world prices in
agriculture by insulating their domestic markets from the world market, thus
avoiding stabilising adjustments of their producers, consumers and traders to
changing world market conditions. These policy-induced instabilities raise the mar-
ket risk of HCED DCs in food trade.
A lowering of the agricultural protection levels in OECD countries, as pro-
posed in the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations, would be a market-oriented
step towards increased self-sufficiency in food in HCED DCs. Given a price-in-
elastic import demand for food in these countries, a reduction of agricultural pro-
tection in OECD countries will lead to rising import expenditures in the short run.
However, short-term income gains from protectionist policies must be balanced
against medium-term inefficiencies in resource allocation as low world market prices
discourage local agricultural production which otherwise would contribute to eco-
nomic diversification in HCED DCs. For individual countries undistorted world mar-14
ket prices could even lead to food exports and an increasing export diversifi-
cation.
The claim for opening markets of industrialised countries for all products and
services from low income countries seems redundant given far-reaching special and
general preferences for this group of countries (Lome Convention, Caribbean Basin
Initiative, GSP). This view is misleading on several grounds. General tariff pre-
ferences have been granted only to specific HCED DCs for a limited number of
agricultural products. In addition, special trade arrangements agreed upon in the
Lome Convention cover only sugar, beef, rum, and bananas. These specific trade
arrangements imply the provision of trade-tied aid [see also pp. 19 f. below], and
especially the Sugar Protocol and the Beef Protocol induce substantial income
transfers to individual commodity producers [Koester, Herrmann, 1987, Section 5].
Such transfers tend to freeze the export structure of HCED DCs as they provide
an incentive to specialise in the traditional export products. As an instrument of
redistribution, the hidden transfers are inferior to a targeted aid policy that is
oriented on indicators of need.
As far as non-traditional products are concerned, protectionist instruments
embodied in preferential trading arrangements are subtle but by no means ineffect-
ive since they have discouraged efforts to establish internationally-competitive lines
of production and nourished export pessimism of potential investors above all in
economically weak countries [ McQueen, 1982; Agarwal et al., 1985, Chapter IV]:
- Rules of origin are less restrictive for low income countries than for advanced
developing countries but still too restrictive given their stage of industrialisa-
tion. They prevent these countries from attracting "finishing touch" activities
which can be a first step towards developing an indigenous industrial sector.
- There is a continuing threat that OECD countries might apply quantitative re-
strictions. Bangladesh's clothing exports to the UK [Spinanger, 1988] and other
examples from the past Lome Conventions (i.e., so-called facultative ceilings
("Ligne ACP") for some textile exports [Promethee, 1983, p. 113]) contradict
those who believe that in particular least developed countries have nothing to
fear.
Moreover, tariffs applied in OECD countries increase with increasing stage of
fabrication. This escalation effect hinders HCED DCs to attract export-oriented
investments in the processing of commodities. Escalation effects have not been re-
moved in multilateral trade negotiations [Yeats, 1987].
To strengthen the case for a liberalisation of OECD imports and a deregu-
lation of commodity policies the OECD Secretariat should further increase its role15
as a surveillance body. An important step in this respect was the computation of
producer and consumer subsidy equivalents in world agriculture [OECD, 1987]. In
addition, comprehensive liberalisation and deregulation schedules could be worked
out by the OECD which clearly pinpoint the need for action in individual OECD
member countries. Enforceability of such programmes will, however, remain an im-
portant problem, since neither the OECD Secretariat nor other international insti-
tutions have effective sanctions at their disposal. A feasible way out may consist
of a commitment of OECD countries to compensate low income countries for refused
liberalisation by additional (contingent) aid payments combined with a change of
voting rights for member countries in the IMF and the World Bank. Under a modi-^
fied rule, the principle of "one country - one vote" would be applied in decisions
on contingent aid allocations provided the OECD Secretariat notifies that the lib-
eralisation programme has been violated by a member country. The maximum aid to
be allocated under this modified rule would be given by the estimated welfare
losses of recipient countries due to refused liberalisation.
3. Basic Guidelines for Development Aid Policies
The main focus of multilateral as well as bilateral aid will have to_be on en-
couraging the implementation of reform programmes in the short to medium term.
During this period, foreign aid can make an essential contribution towards stabil-
ising the economic framework in which both domestic and foreign private investors
have to operate. In this sense, aid will be instrumental in improving the invest-
ment climate in low income countries in times when additional private investment is
most urgently needed. Irrespective of the size of required aid flows this approach
implies a number of general policy guidelines which essentially apply to both bi-
2
lateral and multilateral donors:
- Selectivity. Donors should accept the empirical evidence that aid cannot contri-
bute to economic and social development unless the economic incentive system is
appropriate. If some governments are notoriously unwilling to put their economic
In the context of this policy paper estimates of the resource gap in low income
countries were not feasible. The recent World Bank Report on Sub-Saharan
Africa [ 1988a] notes that a doubling of present aid flows may be required for
this region until the year 2010.
2
For similar recommendations concerning US co-operation with developing coun-
tries, see Smuckler et al. [1988].16
house in order donors should not hesitate to disband support for these govern-
ments or at least reduce their efforts to the supply of emergency relief. If such
a clear-cut policy decision does not seem to be feasible because of foreign policy
considerations, funds disbursed for these reasons should clearly be separated
from development-oriented budgets and institutions.
- Premium approach. If policy reform is initiated from within the countries con-
cerned donors should be prepared to reward domestic efforts by increasing ex-
ternal support. Empirical evidence suggests that financial support for govern-
ments undertaking economic reforms has lagged behind their needs in the past
[Gulhati, Nallari, 1988]. According to this evidence, it was at least partly due
to lacking aid response, particularly by bilateral donors, that policy reforms
were abandoned or stagnated in several African countries such as Malawi, Zaire,
Zambia, and Uganda. A reward of reform efforts will, of course, require the
specification of criteria upon which aid disbursements can be based. Letters of
intent should no longer be accepted as sufficient proof of reform-mindedness.
- Flexibility of country quotas. The above suggestions imply greater flexibility in
aid allocations among low income countries. Country managers in aid institutions
countries should have more discretion to suspend or increase aid flows depending
on political and economic developments in individual countries. The impact of
more flexible aid policies applied by individual donors would, of course, be
strengthened by donor co-ordination. However, co-ordination is costly and
achieves little when bilateral aid allocations are influenced by non-developmental
considerations [Gulhati, Nallari, 1988, pp. 1171 ff. ]. Alternatively, an appro-
priate allocation of aid from all sources could be facilitated if institutions such as
IDA would focus their own aid allocations on total aid flows received by indivi-
dual countries. Under a scheme of "compensatory aid allocation", IDA would
grant more or less funds depending on bilateral aid allocations and the perceived
needs of the countries concerned.
- "Software" orientation of aid programmes and projects. As politico-economic con-
straints and institutional weaknesses were identified as major bottlenecks for
, development in HCED DCs external assistance should be geared towards insti-
tution building, human resource development, control of population growth and
other poverty-related areas (see the subsequent sections). "Hardware" require-
ments such as physical infrastructure should rather be derived from software
oriented-programmes than to be anticipated as independent tasks. It follows from
this suggestion that direct support for diversification at the sectoral level (such17
as credit programmes or product-specific marketing assistance) is not considered
as a priority area for bilateral aid in the 1990s (see also pp. 20 f. below).
- Credibility of donor policies. Greater transparency of aid allocations among coun-
tries and between projects or programmes are expected to have a twofold advan-
tage. Recipient governments become convinced of the development-orientation of
donor policies, and the credibility of aid policies is increased at home in OECD
countries. An appropriate way to improve transparency is to publish country and
feasibility studies prepared under the auspices of aid administrations.
These guidelines provide the background for detailed recommendations on bi-
lateral and multilateral aid policies presented in the subsequent sections. It is as-
sumed below that balance of payments support and structural adjustment loans con-
tinue to be supplied by IMF and World Bank, at terms, however, in line with the
aid philosophy elaborated in this paper.
4. Supporting Institution Building and Human Resource Development
The success of policy reform in low income countries hinges on the mobili-
sation of domestic support for reform, a free flow of information about government
decision-making, enforceability of individual rights against public institutions, and
unhampered mobility as well as improvement of, in particular, human and financial
resources. The institutional prerequisites for smooth adjustment are lacking in most
of these countries to varying degrees. Attempts to design an appropriate insti-
tutional framework suffer from deficiencies in the theory of institution building and
the heterogeneity of the countries concerned. Institutions depend to a substantial
degree on socio-cultural influences and, thus, escape a rigorous economic analysis.
However, empirical evidence has suggested some major areas of concern which pro-
vide a yardstick for country-specific institutional requirements. Generally speak-
ing, external assistance can be instrumental in creating and stabilising an im-
proved domestic economic order, promoting human capital accumulation and es-
tablishing intra-regional institutions among neighbouring countries.
A well-functioning domestic economic order comprises a wide range of political
and institutional aspects. In most low income countries, there is a lack of trans-
parency within the society which reduces access to information and impedes the
articulation of interests. Therefore, measures protecting the freedom of the press,
promoting diversity of written or broadcasted opinion, increasing the flow of re-18
levant economic information (e.g., broadcasted price information) or facilitating the
establishment of special interest groups such as farmers' or producers' associa-
tions, should be attributed a high priority in institution building activities of ex-
ternal donors. Another similarly important area concerns the definition, protection
and enforcement of property rights. Support is needed for cadastral surveys,
land-registration authorities, courts and other independent executive bodies. And
finally, donors should engage in facilitating the emergence of a well-functioning
private capital market. If surpluses generated in the commodity exporting sector
are to be channelled into other productive activities, the private capital market has
an important allocative role to play. Provided local governments can be convinced
to deregulate financial markets, there will be several avenues for external donors
to encourage the domestic intermediation process such as improving and up-dating
accounting systems, credit procedures, branch networks, stock exchange facilities,
and temporary financial support for the introduction of financial innovations. Along
the same lines, there may be scope for increasing the attractiveness of low income
countries for foreign investors which, of course, depends on a removal of domestic
policy barriers to foreign investment in the first place.
Human resource development represents another major element in the software
approach to economic and social development. In the past, aid policies of industri-
alised countries have been mistaken insofar as they were concentrating on secon-
dary education. However, it is mainly vocational training and primary education
that have been shown to increase productivity and to change the generative be-
haviour of the population. External aid for improved primary education and vo-
cational training could involve the development of adequate curricula, the training
of teachers and the supply of teaching equipment. Non-governmental donor organi-
sations (NGOs) may play an important role in this respect. As far as higher edu-
cation is concerned emphasis should be put on the transfer of management and
marketing know-how-and technologies for processing of commodities. More impor-
tantly, however, appears to be substantial support for establishing and maintaining
commodity-related research activities. Agricultural technologies are far less trans-
ferable among continents and countries with different climatical conditions than
other technologies, and indigenous research has been neglected in most HCED DCs
until recently. Furthermore, external assistance may help to stop and eventually
reverse the brain drain observed in many of these countries by supporting a more
adequate research infrastructure with sufficiently attractive job opportunities.
Institution building and human resource development have an intra-regional
dimension. They are prime targets for establishing intra-regional institutions since19
investment and maintenance costs easily exceed the resources available to indivi-
dual countries. Intra-regional co-operation must also focus on facilitating the free
flow of information and resources among countries. External donors can contribute
to improving communication networks and institutions, rationalising energy invest-
ment, strengthening ecological co-operation and joint food security policies as well
as removing physical barriers to the movement of goods and factors of production.
Further details on these issues will be elaborated below.
5. Balance of Payments Support
The devaluation of the national currencies will reduce balance of payments
deficits by diminishing imports and increasing exports. No exports will be forth-
coming in a number of countries, however, even if free access to markets of in-
dustrialised countries is guaranteed in the long term as long as these countries
are not free to pursue an appropriate exchange rate policy. For various member
countries of the Franc Zone there is ample evidence that the national currency is
grossly overvalued [ Devarajan, de Melo, 1987] and that access to the French ca-
pital market can - at least no longer - offset the damaging effects of the overval-
uation. Support for long-term economic development in low income countries
should, therefore, include negotiations among industrialised countries about ways
towards achieving more flexible exchange rate regimes for francophone Africa.
HCED DCs receive balance of payments support in the form of international
agreements for specific commodities and through compensatory financing schemes.
International commodity agreements have - all in all - proven to be rather unsuc-
cessful in reaching their primary targets [Gilbert, 1987]. Two of the agreements,
the International Tin Agreement and the International Cocoa Agreement of 1980,
broke down. Prices were enforced which exceeded the medium-run equilibrium
price and the commodity authorities ran out of funds. A third agreement, the In-
ternational Sugar Agreement, has never been an effective market stabiliser as ma-
jor producing countries did not participate. But even the two agreements which
are often pointed to as success stories, the International Coffee Agreement (ICA)
and the International Natural Rubber Agreement (INRA), are relatively inefficient
in reaching their primary objectives or have strong negative side-effects on factor
allocation [Herrmann, 1988; Burger, Smit, 1988].
In principle, compensatory financing schemes are superior to buffer stock or
export quota policies. They can stabilise national export earnings directly, whereas20
market price stabilisation can stabilise national export earnings only under specific
conditions. No intervention in international commodity markets is necessary and,
hence, compensatory financing can avoid the aggregate welfare losses associated
with price-changing commodity agreements. However, empirical analyses show that
the compensatory financing facility of the IMF and the STABEX system laid down
in the Lome Convention are far from being optimal compensatory financing schemes
[Finger, Derosa, 1980; Koester, Herrmann, 1987]. In many cases, both schemes
did not or not sufficiently stabilise national export earnings as a consequence of
substantial time-lags in compensatory payments and financial constraints. Further-
more, existing compensatory financing schemes are no pure stabilisation schemes
but contain implicit income transfers which are distributed independently of indi-
cators of need.
On the basis of this experience, it cannot be recommended to introduce new
international commodity agreements. If industrialised countries cannot avoid the
renewal of existing commodity agreements they should focus on a strict separation
of redistributive and stabilising elements. Commodity agreements should then deal
with price stabilisation as opposed to price support and compensatory financing
with earnings stabilisation and not earnings support. For compensatory financing
schemes, this means that their stabilising role should be strengthened. The IMF
and STABEX funds could be enlarged and an increased use of the advance-pay-
ments rules could improve their stabilising efficiency. The implicit grant element in
compensatory financing schemes should be reduced and a compensation could occur
by increasing budgetary support.
Important commodity-related decisions have to be made under the Common
Fund which will be created in 1989 or 1990. The Fund's objectives are to finance
buffer-stock activities laid down in international commodity agreements ("First Ac-
count") and other measures in the commodity field ("Second Account"). Originally,
the "First Account" was planned in order to finance the buffer-stock schemes of
ten core commodities to be introduced under the Integrated Commodity Programme
(ICP). As the ICP failed, OECD countries put now more emphasis on the "Second
Credits are granted under more favourable conditions than on commercial mar-
kets. Significant grant elements are involved in the EC scheme where earnings
shortfalls are generally compensated for by interest-free credits without, in
many cases, any repayment duty. The grant element in the IMF scheme is lower
but still important; the interest rates the IMF charges are clearly below market
interest rates.21
Account". It is envisaged to stimulate commodity-related technical progress or mar-
keting activities. Given the guidelines elaborated above, however, the planned
measures under the "Second Account" are as problematic as those under the "First
Account". As a form of commodity-related aid, they are inferior to a targeted aid.
Commodity-related measures under the Common Fund should be oriented at risk
reduction and not at income redistribution. One might think of technical assistance
which strengthens the use of commodity futures and options markets by HCED DCs
in order to stabilise commodity earnings.
6. Budgetary Support
Budgetary support to low income countries will in the first place be a matter
of structural adjustment loans granted by the World Bank. It needs to be stressed
again that direct support should be made contingent on progress in deficit reduc-
tion through, e.g., a phasing-out of subsidies, reduction of the size of the civil
service or privatisation of government activities. However, bilateral donors can
also play an important supplementary role:
- Exchange rate adjustments are easily discouraged because they increase debt
service obligations in local currency and, therefore, tend to kindle domestic in-
flation. Debt service should be limited to those obligations that had existed un-
der historical exchange rates. Another way to alleviate the foreign debt burden
for HCED DCs are debt-for-nature swaps which will be discussed below in grea-
ter detail.
- Further debt relief should be granted by bilateral donors by defering debt ser-
vice payments due and by extending grace periods of disbursed credits. Debt
cancellation is, however, to be avoided since such a policy creates severe moral
hazard problems within and among low income countries [ Buiter, Srinivasan,
1987; Nunnenkamp, 1988].
- Special importance has also to be attached to financial and technical assistance
for tax reform and for improvements of the customs and tax administration.
- And finally, industrialised countries can provide indirect budgetary support by
financing poverty or ecology-related programmes such as "food for work" or eco-
logical preservation measures (for details, see subsequent sections).22
7. Compensation Payments
Structural adjustment as advocated in this paper means that exchange rates
are realigned to deal with shortages in foreign exchange, that agricultural prices
are at parity with international prices, that public expenditures are reduced, and
that markets are allowed to operate more freely. Although these programmes can be
expected to foster income and employment in the medium run, the very poor may
substantially suffer from the policy changes in the transition period. Increasing
food prices and a reduction of transfer payments may lead to a deterioration of the
income and nutritional status of the very poor both in rural and urban areas.
Temporary support for these groups has to be designed in a way not to spoil
incentives for re-migration from urban to rural areas and for increasing food pro-
duction. All poor would benefit from a phased reduction of food subsidies which
focusses on non-subsistence products in the early stages. Food aid should, how-
ever, only be provided in rural areas since support granted to urban poor would
cement the status quo. Food aid to rural areas can be disbursed in the form of
food-foi—work programmes (e.g., for maintaining the ecological balance) or as aid
targeted to specific groups (poor children, women, landless labourers, etc. ). The
more successful the targeting is, the less food aid will distort market incentives,
as it will create additional demand for food which would otherwise not exist. Such
a re-oriented approach would be quite different from the existing food aid policy.
As is well-established, current food aid policy is largely oriented at the donor's
goals of surplus disposal or strategic policy considerations. Hence, it is to a large
extent a permanent instrument inducing the well-known disincentives for domestic
food production.
8. General Poverty-Related Measures
Social development of low income countries suffers from a number of pover-
ty-related problems which cannot be elaborated in detail in this paper. The most
important one is excessive population growth. By all indicators there are no short-
term solutions to changing the generative behaviour of people. Nonetheless, ex-
ternal donors should strive to continue support for improving hygienical condi-
• tions, health care and other measures that offer at least long-term chances to ulti-
•,f mately reduce population growth. In many of these areas, there may be chances
for a cost-reducing cooperation among neighbouring countries.23
Another area of increasing concern is the preservation of the economic po-
tential of low income countries by environmental protection. Especially in low in-
come HCED DCs, natural resources are often underrated assets and the long-term
costs of excessive exploitation are shifted to future generations. Deforestation, for
example, is encouraged by accounting systems which neglect the public use aspects
of the environment (health, quality of life). Ecological policies of these countries
should be supported by external aid as citizens of industrialised countries assign a
higher priority to world-wide environmental protection than citizens of low income
economies.
Aid may take the form of lump sum payments to compensate for income losses
which are due to domestic ecological policies. Even if such aid is made contingent
to controllable changes of resource use several problems may still arise. Extensive
monitoring is necessary to enforce the commitment of HCED DCs to avoid excessive
exploitation of natural resources. It is open to question whether aid payments will
reach those who suffer from income losses in the first place. And, moral hazard
may induce the governments of these countries to abandon formerly implemented
ecological policies unless external aid is granted for these measures as well.
One way of containing such problems could be to make aid conditional on the
establishment and enforcement of property rights. Property rights may be granted
to international ecological organisations such as the World Wildlife Fund or to re-
gional cooperative bodies. By assigning regional organisations a central role, the
concern of HCED DCs' governments to maintain national sovereignly may be re-
duced. Transfers of property rights could at least be considered in cases where
the exploitation of natural resources results from large-scale logging or other
forms of overuse of widely unpopulated areas. Conflicts with the local population
would be minimal in such cases. Other types of exploitation of natural resources,
e.g., fire, overgrazing, shortened fallow periods etc., may require different legal
procedures and, most important, provision of alternative sources of employment
and income for those poor segments of the rural population who have so far de-
pended on these scarce natural resources for their food security and survival.
The enforcement of environment relief should also be encouraged in the con-
text of debt-nature swaps. In this case, OECD countries would grant debt relief in
exchange for property rights on natural resources as well as in exchange for a
successful and controllable reversal of past trends in environmental damage. Since
dept-nature swaps frequently involve a substitution of domestic for external debt
additional aid payments may be required; otherwise overall debt service obligations
of the public sector of low income countries may even increase.24
V. Concluding Remarks
The recommendations presented in this paper are based on the generally ac-
knowledged observation that the substantial support granted by external donors to
low income countries in the past has produced at best marginal results here and
there, but was not able to halt the economic and social decline of these countries.
The search for reasons of this development has led to the conclusion that present
aid policies applied by industrialised countries put too much emphasis on assistance
to the commodity sector taking the macro-economic and sector-policy framework as
given. Donors have neglected the political economy of decision-making in low in-
come countries while overtaxing the existing texture of their societies. It is argued
that neither more foreign aid nor more sophisticated or modified commodity-oriented
policies alone are able to turn the tide. What is needed is a sweeping re-orienta-
tion of aid policies in the 1990s. Priority should be given to a strengthening of
political bargaining processes within low income countries and to institution build-
ing at all levels of society. It is expected that progress in these directions im-
proves the capabilities of these countries in coherent, rational economic policy
formulation and enforcement of economic policies which are necessary preconditions
for a return to sustained economic growth and social development.25
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